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Abstract 
 
The relationship between banks and society in UK remains fragile more than 10 years after the fi-
nancial crisis. The level of public mistrust, though lower than in the aftermath of the crisis, still re-
mains at unsatisfactory levels especially as scandals continue to plague the sector. This raises the 
question of the effectiveness of reforms adopted in UK during the past 10 years to improve the pub-
lic oversight of banks and change their culture. The reforms resulted in a significant expansion of 
the scope of financial regulation through the adoption of large numbers of new rules with binding 
effect on banks. In addition, new supervisory bodies were created to more closely monitor bank ac-
tivities. This paper reviews the effects of the reforms on bank culture and concludes that expanded 
  
regulation and compulsory norms brought about mixed results and had only moderate effect on re-
pairing the relationship between banks and UK society. The paper argues that more significant cul-
tural change could come only from the banks themselves and therefore, going forward, the scope of 
compulsory norms should be reduced. The paper contributes to the ongoing dialogue between in-
dustry experts, policy makers and lawyers about the optimum levels of financial regulation espe-
cially in light of recent calls for rolling back parts of public interventions in the financial sector. 
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Introduction 
 
  More than ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, the British public still does not trust their 
banks. Several surveys of public opinion in 2018 confirmed that whilst there have been some im-
provements in UK banks’ public image since the crisis, a large part of the UK public still shows 
negative attitudes towards banks. By way of example, the August 2018 survey of Yougov for Posi-
tive Money found that 66% of the British Public do not trust banks to work in the best interests of 
UK society and 63% fear that UK banks may cause another financial crisis
1
. These findings are 
consistent with findings of similar surveys in previous years such as the 2017 Populous survey
2
, 
which found that less than half of the UK public trust any bank to do the right thing. A 2013 Report 
of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS) found
3
 that the UK public was an-
gry because it felt that the banks took advantage of its members, that bankers took excessive re-
wards not justified by their work and that they were not accountable for irresponsible and dishonest 
behaviour. The report and other documents described a culture of greed and corruption which had 
ruined the relationship between banks and society in UK.
4
 
  Similarly, a Yougov-Cambridge public survey in 2013 found that 73% of those surveyed de-
scribed the reputation of banking as bad and only 4% believed that banks observed high ethical and 
                                                 
1
 see Positive Money, “Polling: 10 Years After the Financial Crisis, the British Public Still Don't Trust  Banks”, 16 Au-
gust, 2018, available at https://positivemoney.org/2018/08/british-public-dont-trust-banks/  
2
 Available at https://www.populus.co.uk/2017/12/trust-banks-went-wrong-fix/  
3
 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, (2013) ’Changing Banking for good’, Final Report, vol.I, p.15, 
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-volume-i.pdf 
4
Ibid. 
  
moral standards 
5
. The UK press and various commentators have often branded the bankers “crimi-
nals” and the financial institutions “criminal institutions”6. 
  A leading reason for the high level of public discontent can be found in the consequences of the 
financial crisis, which had significant economic and social costs. Several scandals
7
, which contin-
ued to plague the sector post-crisis, made the situation for banks even worse. Bank leaders have of-
ten been forced to acknowledge their level of responsibility for the negative public opinion and sev-
eral declared their willingness to do whatever it takes to win back public confidence
8
 although more 
pessimistic views refer to negative public perception of banks “for a generation”9.  Bankers defend-
ing their social contributions highlight, between others, the significant work they have done to sup-
port the national economy and the local Communities
10
. 
  One of the focal points of criticism based on the surveys of public opinion and government re-
views of the sector is the prevailing culture within banks, which is deemed to be generating greed 
and corruption. Culture has various definitions. A working definition used here is: “learned 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law and custom in society”11. 
  After the financial crisis UK society targeted particularly the established beliefs of bankers and the 
moral aspects of banking, whilst seeking the adoption of a new legal framework which would be 
imposing stricter public controls on banks. However, bringing about the required change in morality 
is a complex and difficult task requiring long term efforts in order to produce tangible results. There 
are also serious doubts about the ability of regulation to lead such efforts. Market-driven and banks-
led initiatives may be more effective. A central aspect of voluntary activities with focus on the rela-
tionship with society is linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
  CSR is a term with global significance. It refers, broadly speaking, to processes and actions 
through which corporations voluntarily acknowledge their responsibility to the broader society and 
not only to their shareholders. CSR is an essential tool in the efforts of corporations to build a posi-
                                                 
5
 YouGov-Cambridge (2013) “Public Trust in Banking - YouGov”, Report. 
6
 See e.g. Bosworth-Davies R. (2015) “The emergence of the criminal financial institution: can effective measures be 
implemented to deal with them?” Comp. Law. 2015, 36(10), 307-309. 
7
 The sector faced negative publicity due to bank collapses resulting in massive taxpayer bailouts and other costly pub-
lic financial support, the libor scandal, the culture of excessive bonuses, predatory lending scandals (e.g. overdrafts), 
mis-selling practices (PPI), and other illegal activities (e.g. money laundering). 
8
 Stephan Shakespeare of Yougov (op.cit.5) who spoke with industry leaders, found that banks were willing to take the 
hit if this would help them to regain public trust and promised to carry out root-and-branch reform to change the public 
image of their institutions. 
9
 Tim Wallace “Customers won't trust banks for a generation”, The Telegraph, 6 March 2016. 
10
 See e.g. the British Bankers’ Association report “The Benefits of Banking 2016”, which details the initiatives and 
projects beneficial to local communities and the broader economy supported by UK banks. 
11
A. Freiberg, (2010), The Tools of Regulation, The Federation Press, p.104, cited in J. McCalman, A. Young and R. 
Chan (2017) “Regulating the culture of banks in the United Kingdom: strengthening legal accountability or just better 
leadership?” J.I.B.L.R., 32(6), pp: 261-268. 
  
tive relationship with society and to gain legitimacy
12
. CSR, which was popularized by Bowen 
(1953)
13
, demonstrates significant local variations in regard to its goals and activities. In many 
countries especially in Europe, there is the so-called implicit approach to CSR, where mandatory 
and customary rules are used to establish specific CSR requirements to corporations
14
 thus limiting 
the voluntary character of CSR and the companies’ freedom. 
  Financial services is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the world and although the 
goals of financial regulation are, broadly speaking, different from those of the CSR (regulation pri-
marily focuses on regulating the operation of banks and on preserving market stability, whereas 
CRS focuses primarily on the relationship between banks and society
15
) they still contain elements, 
which are common with CSR
16
. The use of compulsory norms in the form of regulation has often 
been promoted to stimulate and guide the voluntary CSR activities of the banks. 
  Considering the mix of compulsory and voluntary activities pursued by the reforms which were 
adopted following the financial crisis it is relatively easy to notice that compulsion on many occa-
sions took the lead. A large number of new sets of rules were adopted to regulate and control indi-
vidual and bank activities within the sector, new supervisory bodies were created to oversee com-
pliance with the new requirements and heavier penalties were imposed on violators. In addition, 
financial institutions have been encouraged to take their own voluntary initiatives to restore a spirit 
of individual and institutional social responsibility within their ranks. As a result, new codes of 
conduct and ethics for banks and bankers have been adopted by individual banks and bank associa-
tions and a number of initiatives aimed at involving the broader UK society, such as the more active 
involvement of outsiders, civil society and existing stakeholders in the decisions of banks and bank-
related organisations have been used all for the purpose of enabling cultural change and of making 
banks and bankers more responsible.
17
.  
   The key question which this paper seeks to address is if the goal of making banks and bankers 
more responsible can be achieved primarily through compulsory norms or if voluntary schemes de-
veloped by individual banks or banker associations and related bodies can be more appropriate to 
lead.  
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 Meyer et al. (2015) “Legitimating the transnational corporation in a stateless world society” in K. Tsutsui & A. Lim 
(Eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Business and Public Policy, pp. 25-26). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
13
 Bowen H. (1953), Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. 
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Matten D. Moon J. (2008) “Implicit” and “Explicit” CSR: a Conceptual Framework for a comparative understanding 
of Corporate Social Responsibility” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 33, No. 2, 404–424. 
15
 See also Armour et al. (2016) Principles of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, 51. 
16
 See for example below the discussion of the new individual accountability rules adopted by regulators, which aim at 
making bankers more responsible. 
17
 For more details see the references elsewhere in the article to the role of bodies such as the Banking Standards Board, 
a private independent body, created in 2015 with the involvement of outsiders and civil society, to support  cultural 
change in the industry. 
  
  The paper contributes to the ongoing dialogue in the literature and between policymakers on 
whether the significant expansion of mandatory rules introduced in the UK and internationally in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis can be effective in making financial institutions more socially 
responsible and in preventing future crises. An additional, but related, objective is to discuss wheth-
er culture, which is one of the key drivers behind bank behaviour, can be changed using compulsory 
norms or through voluntary schemes. The focus is on UK financial services since the country expe-
rienced a strong impact from the financial crisis with major bank failures, which resulted in signifi-
cant costs for the national economy and a very tense relationship between the country’s banks and 
the UK society. The paper emphasizes the need for more explicit, voluntary participation of banks 
in the efforts to create a more resilient and reliable financial system, which will regain the trust and 
confidence of UK society.  
  The paper is structured as follows: the first section considers the definition and standards of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) in the literature and in some key legal instruments; the second sec-
tion focuses on a discussion of the standards of social responsibility expected of UK banks and of 
the level of compliance of the UK financial sector with its social obligations; the third section looks 
for reasons for the failure of UK banks to meet social expectations; the fourth section discusses 
what has been done to address the breakdown in the relationship between banks and UK society; 
the fifth section debates the utility and limits of laws and regulations; the sixth section looks to the 
issue whether reconciliation between banks and society can be achieved through voluntary means or 
through regulation; the seventh section discusses the implications of CSR and success stories; the 
eighth section discusses the way forward and the ninth section summarizes the key issues arising 
from the paper. 
 
1. The definition and standard of corporate social responsibility in theory and the law. 
 
a. Definition of CSR 
 
  Broadly speaking, CSR suggests that corporations should recognize their responsibilities to a larg-
er set of actors beyond the corporation’s shareholders and that they should act to advance the wel-
fare of all these actors (Prakash 2015
18
). Generally acceptable elements of CSR include economic, 
legal, ethical and discretionary activities (Carroll 1991).  Matten and Moon (2008)
19
 characterize 
CSR as “nationally contingent, essentially contested, and dynamic” term. This is explained partly 
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 Prakash A. (2015) “Corporate Social Responsibility as Social Regulation” in K. Tsutsui, A. Arbor,.A. Lim (Ed.), 
Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World, Cambridge University Press, 430-454. 
19
Op.cit.14. 
  
on grounds of CSR being a contested and internally complex term with open-ended rules of applica-
tion (Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2005
20
), a term which is an umbrella one covering a number of other 
terms with often synonymous and overlapping meanings (Matten & Crane, 2005
21
). The concept of 
CRS is constantly evolving in a dynamic way (Carroll 1999
22
) in response to the evolving nature of 
the relationship between corporations and the societies in which these corporations operate
23
. Thus, 
from an initial emphasis on environmental issues, the concept gradually incorporated in its content 
economic and social issues with emphasis on human rights (Rosamund 2015
24
). 
  Although multinational corporations (MNCs) have helped to spread CSR around the world to gain 
global legitimacy and to fill the governance gap currently existing at an international level (Meyer 
et al. 2015
25
), this does not mean that CSR has an exclusively global focus. Kinderman (2015
26
) 
suggests that national-level CSR is particularly important and is used by corporations to minimize 
public backlash to deregulation or to gain legitimacy. This seems to be the case particularly for the 
financial sector, which despite significant expansion beyond national borders during the past dec-
ades has maintained its strong national character and focus. 
  At policy level, in the European Union, the above reality of CSR is reflected in official policy 
documents and in legislation. The European Commission has defined CSR as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their in-
teraction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”27. The term covers voluntary, business-led 
actions by companies “over and above their legal obligations towards society and the environ-
ment”28. In 2011 the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs
29
), which further expanded the scope of 
CSR to the area of human rights. The UNGPs will gradually become part of national law and policy 
around the world.  
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of Management Review, 30: 166–179.  
22
 Carroll, A. B. 1999. Corporate social responsibility— Evolution of a definitional construct. Business and Society, 38: 
268–295.  
23
 UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, (2014) “Good for Business & Society: Government Response to 
call for Views on Corporate Responsibility”, April. 
24
 Rosamund T. M. (2015), Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics International Press, p.53. 
25
 Meyer et al. (2015) “Legitimating the transnational corporation in a stateless world society” in K. Tsutsui & A. Lim 
(Eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Business and Public Policy, pp. 25-26). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
26
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World (Business and Public Policy, pp. 73-106). 
27
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  It is notable that although CSR is voluntary, the use of compulsory norms, in the form of the adop-
tion of laws and regulations is often seen as necessary in order to create an environment “more con-
ducive to enterprises voluntarily meeting their social responsibility” as the European Commission30 
has put it. As a result, provisions with CSR elements appear in various types of legislation, which 
have a compulsory nature (e.g. financial regulations
31
).  
  Further, law is usually split into hard and soft law. Hard law contains specific, legally building re-
quirements, whose violation is often associated with sanctions to violators. Soft law is not legally 
binding, but can exert significant influence by guiding public expectations. Declarations, guidelines 
and related documents are used as part of soft law. Both types of law seek to limit individual free-
dom with hard law seeking to achieve it in a more explicit way: compliance with hard law, unlike 
soft law, is not discretionary. Regulation employs both hard and soft law instruments. 
  The laws related to CSR usually introduce broadly phrased guidance for companies to engage in 
“socially responsible” activities and to report on these activities but they leave to the companies to 
determine how they are going to engage society and how to report their activities. By way of exam-
ple, Principle 14 of UNGPs reads: “The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human 
rights applies to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and 
structure. Nevertheless, the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that 
responsibility may vary according to these factors and with the severity of the enterprise’s adverse 
human rights impacts”. 
 In other occasions, when society wants to send a clear message, hard law is used for setting out 
specific requirements. For example, EU Directive 2014/95 requires from large companies to dis-
close non-financial and diversity information. Additional sets of guidelines and advice are produced 
by various organizations public or private such as example the guidelines issued by GRI
32
, an inter-
national independent organization helping companies to comply with their sustainability obligations 
or the Banking Standards Board (BSB), an independent, non-statutory, voluntary membership body, 
which was established in UK in 2015 “with the aim of helping to raise standards of behaviour and 
competence across the UK banking sector”33. These guidelines are soft (non-binding) law docu-
ments, which though are widely used by the companies to design their CSR policies and to report 
on them. 
                                                 
30
 Op.cit.31. 
31
See e.g. the Conduct Rules, introduced by FCA and PRA in 2016 in UK to impose individual rules of conduct to em-
ployees of UK banks. 
32
 GRI has set out Global Standards for Sustainability Reporting which can be used by companies 
(https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx).   
33
 https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/ BSB carries out annual assessment of UK banks standards of behavior. 
  
  The extent to which rules and norms are used to define and drive CSR activities often gives rise to 
a distinction between “explicit” and “implicit” CSR. “Explicit” CSR leaves responsibility for CSR 
decisions and policies to individual companies using voluntary activities, whereas “implicit” CSR 
refers to a more collective approach usually driven by rules and norms (Matten and Moon 2008
34
), 
with which companies must comply. 
  The combined effect of the nexus of laws and regulations linked to CSR is that companies enjoy 
certain freedom when designing their CSR activities, but this freedom is guided by rules setting out 
contexts and goals, which have to be met. Companies have no freedom to completely ignore their 
social responsibilities. 
 
b. Standards of CSR 
 
  An obvious question which emerges from the precedent analysis is about  the acceptable standard 
of CSR. Existing laws in UK and internationally do not provide clear answer to this important ques-
tion. Social responsibility can be manifested in myriads ways and at different levels and though lo-
cal laws often set specific goals for various areas of bank activity they do not always set measurable 
standards, which could be used to assess if banks achieved these goals. Public perceptions of corpo-
rate social responsibility also demonstrate significant local variations. Due to these limitations it is 
sometimes prudent to seek to extract CSR goals and standards by looking to the identified problems 
which law and society expects from banks to address. 
  By way of example, PCBS report
35
 recorded serious complaints from small and medium UK busi-
ness about access to loans in the early years following the financial crisis. UK public expected 
banks to reciprocate for the bailouts by increasing support for the UK economy. Yougov (2013) 
survey
36
 confirmed this public perception and added that UK public wanted banks to stop greed, 
stop being a public risk, stop putting profits before people and improve compliance with govern-
ment regulations. PCBS report recorded public demands for UK banks to offer better service to 
consumers, for example by avoiding mis-selling practices. 
  BSB, which carries out annual assessments of UK bank standards of behaviour and culture, has 
identified nine characteristics against which banks are assessed: honesty, respect, openness, ac-
countability, competence, reliability, responsiveness, personal and organisational resilience, and 
shared purpose
37
 . Although BSB provides definitions and guidance to its members on each each of 
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 Op.cit.14. 
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 Op.cit.3 
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 Op.cit.5 
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 Available at https://www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/assessment-results-2017/  
  
these characteristics, the definitions are broad and the standards can be assessed though qualitative 
evidence. 
   At law level, UK adopted a variety of laws since the financial crisis, which one way or another 
seek to control and improve conduct of banks and bankers. For example, in 2016 UK enacted
38
 a 
new senior Managers and Certification Regime, which is aimed at increasing individual responsibil-
ity and accountability of senior managers. It requires banks to seek regulators’ approval when ap-
pointing senior managers. The process requires a clear statement of responsibilities for the appoint-
ed person. The certification regime requires banks to check and certify that employees in important 
positions (other than senior managers) are fit and proper for these positions. While increasing indi-
vidual responsibility and accountability is part of the efforts to make UK banks more socially re-
sponsible, it is not clear how banks can meet the standard of responsibility: gaining authorities’ ap-
proval for senior management appointments does not guarantee socially responsible behaviour by 
the appointed senior bankers. 
  At EU level, several initiatives exist to improve the CSR records of companies operating in EU, 
such as disseminating good practices, enhancing market rewards for CSR, incorporating CSR into 
education, training and research and others
39
.  A significant Commission initiative is to promote 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights
40
. Again, measuring 
success in implementation, despite the Commission’s efforts, remains a challenge.  
Similar uncertainty may be expected for the Global Code of Good Practice for Foreign Exchange 
Markets issues in 2017 by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
41
. The Code requires market 
participants to “…strive for the highest ethical standards”, citing that they should act honestly, fair-
ly and with integrity.  
  The above indicative examples show that the best way to evaluate the social behaviour of banks is 
through a case-by-case consideration using definitions and objectives relevant to each case. 
 
 
2. Compliance with the standards of CSR in the UK financial sector 
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 The new regime was introduced by the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which amended the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. It is also discussed elsewhere in the article. 
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 More information on EU’s policies can be found on the Commission’s CSR website: 
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  From the previous section it emerged that CSR has four main features: an umbrella term, volun-
tary, constantly evolving, with local significance. It also emerged that there are no clear standards 
or methods of measuring CSR performance except in specific, narrowly defined, cases. A potential 
solution is therefore, to record CSR progress of UK banks in various areas and identify current is-
sues. 
  Herzig and Moon (2012
42
) claim that prior to the financial crisis, the sector had made significant 
progress in incorporating CSR into their operations citing as an example, between others, the 
broader acceptance that banks are often well-regarded because of their involvement in philanthropy 
and charities, the equal treatment of their employees, diversity and job creation. Banks also played a 
prominent role in significant CSR activities and organizations in the UK and in community projects. 
A British Bankers Association Report
43
 claimed that in 2015 British Banks opened £9 million basic 
bank accounts to most vulnerable people, that they now offer a bank account to 99% of UK adults 
over the age of 15 and that they lent £58 billion of new loans to small businesses. Such claims are 
particularly aimed at addressing expressed concerns that the UK banking system leaves outside of 
its services the most vulnerable people and without enough access to finance many small and medi-
um enterprises
44
. In addition, the institution of mutualized Building societies, which have a long 
history in the UK offers support to community and individual development projects whereas in re-
gard to CSR itself it seems that there is evidence that the concept has become institutionalized in the 
UK at least since the recession of the 1980s
45
. 
  UK society, though, is still not convinced. For the level of public discontent Herzig and Moon 
(2012) offered the straightforward explanation that the last financial crisis had such grave conse-
quences that rendered all bank efforts in the CSR field less significant. They claim that the crisis 
revealed that CSR had not been incorporated into core bank businesses, those which led to the bank 
failures. Andrews (2016)
46
 offers a different explanation slightly more comforting for the banks: the 
benefits from the operation of banks to society are difficult to see because: “… one cannot easily 
envisage the so-called counterfactual: what our society would be like without modern finance”. So-
ciety doesn’t seem to be looking to the right place. McDermott of FCA, (201547)  focuses on the 
disconnection existing between financial institutions and society blaming the former for it: 
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“…[F]inance too often became disconnected from the world in which it operated and the people it 
was supposed to serve...The culture had become one of short termism. In some cases this was com-
pounded by greed and a sense of impunity. And in many different ways, that led to the issues that 
have occurred, and which seemed to keep on occurring.” 
  The above views seem to be bringing to light another problem: that banks and society do not seem 
to fully agree on the standards and priorities of social responsibility for the financial sector. Society 
seems to have broader demands, which have not been met. 
  The Yougov-Cambridge survey (2013
48
) considering the issue found that the UK public wants: a) 
Utility: banks are not perceived as working hard enough to support  economic growth for the UK or 
their customers and are actually holding the economy back; b) Safety: banks are considered unsafe, 
a public risk, and not in compliance with government regulations; c) fairness: bankers continue to 
be seen as greedy and untrustworthy, putting profit before people. These demands show that fund-
ing more community projects or improving access to finance for poor and disadvantaged or small 
and medium enterprises, do not go far enough to satisfy the demands of society. Traditional CSR 
activities, even if reinforced, are not enough. 
  The PCBS Report (2013
49
) revealed that public demands are based on the knowledge that the tax-
payer paid a lot of money to save the banks during the financial crisis, so the public expects the 
banks to reciprocate something which they do not feel they can see happening. 
 
 
3.Why do banks fail to meet the standards of social responsibility?  
 
 
  The previous section provided already a potential answer: society and banks have diverging views 
on standards and priorities of CSR and therefore UK banks fail to meet public expectations. But 
there are other potential explanations. 
  Boatright (2014
50
), analysing the problem of chronic misconduct in the sector, notes that 
“…ethical misconduct is not always a matter of bad people doing bad things but often of good peo-
ple who stumble unwittingly into wrongdoing”. He claims that most people working in finance are 
decent, dedicated, people who fall victims of the sector’s focus on profits. He also claims that scan-
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 Boatright, J.R. Ethics in Finance, Wiley, 2013; also, PCBS report op.cit.3, p.82. 
  
dals do not require deliberate misconduct. Staere (2018
51
), citing Milgram et al. (Levilee 2011
52
) 
suggests that good people can do bad things if they belong to a group or community which has “a 
coercive culture that enforces compliance and conformity”. If a culture of fear exist in an organiza-
tion then even good people could react badly. Staere cites as examples, the mis-selling (PPI) and 
market manipulation (LIBOR) scandals, which happened in an area with strong rules-based regula-
tion. According to Staere, the scandals “have been perpetrated by people working within cultures 
driven by a coercive focus on short-term profit maximization, demanded by analysts, investors, 
boards and senior management” (citing also Wheatley, 201453). 
  Yougov-Cambridge UK survey (2013
54
) found that 67% of the UK public trust “staff at my local 
bank” to tell the truth. This is as high as the proportion of the public which trusts judges. So, the 
public seems to be sharing Boatright’s the view that most individuals working in banks are good 
and trustworthy. However, in the same survey only 13% trust investment bankers indicating the 
problem posed by investment banking, which was one of the key causes of the financial crisis. It 
seems that the public points the finger at investment bankers as “bad guys” in the sector. 
  Mullineux (2011
55
; 1987) reinforces the argument about the focus on profits as a leading cause 
arguing that the social compact between the sector and the government broke down in the 1980s 
when the big UK banks shifted their focus on maximizing the value for their shareholders. This may 
imply that deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s, which gave UK banks more freedom from govern-
ment controls and allowed them to increase risk-taking and seek profit maximization, which gener-
ated the crisis a few decades later. 
  The above views bring to light the role of ethics and culture both individual and institutional. Ac-
cording to Bailey of PRA (2016
56
), “culture has thus laid the ground for bad outcomes, for instance 
where management are so convinced of their rightness, that they hurtle for the cliff without ques-
tioning the direction of travel”. Andrews of FCA (201657) refers to a culture of tolerance of non-
compliance prevailing in the banking sector, by pointing out that there is a long history of apparent-
ly clear principles of financial conduct regulation (e.g. ’treating customers fairly’) and of firms 
signing up for these principles but showing limited evidence of compliance: “the level of tolerance 
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of non-compliance in financial services regulation…is very striking”58. MacDermott of FCA 
(2014
59
) reinforces this view by reporting the response FCA enforcing teams often receive when 
visiting the banks: “We are still told that misconduct is the work of a few errant individuals within 
large organizations”.  
  However, and despite the frequent references to culture as a source of the problem, it remains no-
toriously difficult to define and measure culture. A 2018 paper of FCA
60
, citing the views of various 
stakeholders, claims that now there is a broad consensus in the industry that culture is about behav-
iour,‘the way things are done around here’ and includes “the norms, values and practices which are 
revealed by how people think and behave, as well as our behaviour when no-one is looking”61.   
  The above definition to be a workable one though, requires identification and measurement of the 
components of culture. This would help to understand how and why culture has led to bank failure. 
Banker remuneration (the “bonus culture”) and ineffective governance, are often cited62 as key 
drivers of a failing culture in banking. PCBS report found greed and corruption as two other ele-
ments of a failing culture, whilst FCA above referred to widespread tolerance of non-compliance in 
the sector.  
    Bailey of FCA (2017
63
) touches upon the problem that culture does not have a single or unified 
form. He claims that culture is not the same for each company neither should it be. Each organiza-
tion has its own, unique culture shaped by inputs unique for each organization. Banking Standards 
Board annual review for 2016/17 reinforces this by highlighting that understanding and managing 
culture is a core responsibility of the bank’s board which “…cannot be delegated to regulators, pol-
icy makers or a specific function within the firm, such as compliance, risk or human resources”64.  
BSB also emphasizes “the significance of size and inter-connectedness of the UK banking sector”.  
  This leads us to the conclusion that whilst referring to an overall bad culture in the sector offers a 
good start, identifying the individual level of bank cultural failure is a much more complex task.  
Some banks are serial violators of norms when others are not and when looking for the cause of 
bank failures you will have to dig deep into each bank separately rather than take a sector approach. 
  The problem of culture does not seem to concern only the financial institutions but also those, who 
were tasked with ensuring that these institutions complied with the requirements of the society. 
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Regulation in the past demonstrated on many occasions spectacular failures to identify the problems 
and prevent them from happening in the financial sector. The PCBS report
65
 cited Wheatley of FCA 
stating that the regulatory failure “[...] was a failure of philosophy” indicating the in addition to 
banks, regulators also face their own problem of culture. Lord Turner, who in 2009 led the review 
of the causes of the financial crisis, argued that long periods between banking crises tend to breed 
complacency
66
. Regulation faces additional challenges from information gaps, lack of resources, 
fragmentation, regulatory arbitrage and the failure to catch up with market speed
67
. In addition, 
markets move in real time, something which regulators cannot often do. As a result, regulators, 
whose role is between others to protect the public and society from harmful bank activities and to 
help banks meet their social obligations, went through their own soul searching after the financial 
crisis.  
    
4. What has been done to address the problem 
A consensus emerged, as a result of the crisis in the UK and internationally, that banks cannot be 
trusted to behave responsibly on their own. Many felt that the freedom the banks enjoyed during the 
three decades prior to the financial crisis, when the wave of deregulation and bank privatizations 
reduced public scrutiny and control of the financial sector, was not used by financial institutions to 
advance the public good. Banks’ freedom had to be restricted and, in many areas, voluntary compli-
ance had to be replaced by mandatory rules through the introduction of relevant legislation.  
As a result, massive reforms were introduced in the UK and internationally, aimed at expanding the 
scope of public scrutiny to new areas. These reforms resulted in the UK in 13,000 pages (and grow-
ing) of rules, guidance and supervisory statements published by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), two of the new regulators
68
. The administrative 
costs of the new regulators have been claimed to be over £1.2 billion a year – six times what they 
were in 2000
69
. Thousands more pages of rules were produced by other UK and International regu-
lators all aimed at making the financial system more stable and accountable and on tackling the cul-
tural problem. What differentiates the latest efforts on regulation from previous ones is that they 
place emphasis on holding accountable not only the financial institutions but also key individuals 
(middle and senior managers) within them. The focus on the role of individuals is central in the ef-
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forts to tackle the problem of culture. There is also for the first time strong emphasis on more proac-
tive regulation by identifying and tackling sector risks before they become systemic problems. 
5. The utility and limits of laws and regulations 
  When assessing the utility of laws and regulations one should consider two aspects: first, the rules 
themselves which are introduced to regulate a specific issue and, second, the effectiveness of the 
enforcement mechanism with public supervision having a prominent role. Simply speaking, rules 
can be effective not only when they are well targeted but also when there is in place an effective 
mechanism of supervision and enforcement, which ensures the implementation of the rules and the 
effective detection and punishment of any violators. This is where things start to get complicated.  
  First, compulsory rules as those introduced by law and regulations, by establishing an ever-
expanding web of legal obligations tend to pass the duty of enforcing social responsibility to regula-
tors, who must ensure that these responsibilities are met. Those, on whom the obligations are im-
posed, in this case the financial institutions, tend to take a back seat and let the regulators lead the 
way. Steare, cited by Wheatley 2014
70
, submits that “…[A]t their worst, laws, regulations […] re-
move our responsibility for deciding what’s right”. Is this the best way though to enforce change of 
culture? 
  Rosamund (2015) considering the advantages and disadvantages of using binding norms highlights 
that the norms offer clarity about what must be done, clarity about the sanctions to be suffered by 
the violators and an impartial tribunal which will decide on the sanctions and any dispute arising 
from the application of the norms. However, the risk of compliance becoming a ticking-box exer-
cise, lacking much substance is real. Along similar lines, Filabi (2018)
71
 adds that there is a danger 
that people will focus narrowly on rules and underweight ethical considerations. She submits that 
regulation is largely dependent upon a hypothesis of rational behaviour on behalf of those who are 
subject to regulation. The threat of punishment would drive rational behaviour leading to compli-
ance. However, as she notes, individuals do not always act rationally as there are other factors in-
fluencing behaviour such as individual or organizational principles and goals. The latter could mo-
tivate individuals to ignore compliance with regulation.  
  Adding credibility to the above argument, experience on the effectiveness of sanctions mecha-
nisms shows that even heavy penalties are not always capable of deterring widespread violations of 
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the norms (Ischenko et al 2016
72
). This has been attributed to entrenched perception within banks 
that breaches of the rules will not be detected or punished. But even in those cases where detection 
was improved, and punishment became tougher through higher fines, the effect on deterrence on 
many occasions was not promising. Ischenko et al 2016, cite the case of Barclays, which in recent 
years has been subject to several fines for various violations of the rules as an example of a situa-
tion where tougher regulation has failed to produce the desired deterrence. In 2017 the FCA, im-
posed  on Deutsche Bank a £163 million fine, the “largest financial penalty for anti-money launder-
ing controls failings ever imposed by the FCA, or its predecessor”73.  The same bank between 2016 
and 2018 was involved in a number of high profile violations of the rules in the UK and US which 
resulted in significant fines and settlements including a $425 million fine by US regulators for anti-
money laundering violations, a massive £7.2 billion settlement with US regulators for mortgage-
backed securities, a $205 million settlement for manipulating forex and a $70 million settlement for 
rigging a benchmark for interest-rate derivatives and other financial instruments. Bloomberg esti-
mated that since 2008 Deutsche Bank paid more than $17 billion in fines
74
. Many of the Deutsche 
Bank cases involved also other major banks including Barclays which had, equally, to pay signifi-
cant fines for violations of legislation. More recently Goldman Sachs senior managers had in-
volvement in a major of scandal known as “1MDB”, which concerned mismanagement of Malaysi-
an sovereign investment fund.   
  Putting these cases in a broader perspective it is easy to see that many of the serious violations 
concerned actions occurred after the financial crisis and in the presence of a web of “comprehen-
sive” regulations and supervisors. Whilst someone could treat these cases as evidence of the success 
of the new regulatory regime, someone else would equally willingly see the failure of the new ap-
proach to bring about the desired cultural change in the financial sector. 
  Voluntary schemes, the alternative to regulation, have the advantage that they are driven by the 
banks themselves which are, thus, encouraged to demonstrate their “best practices”, not only to 
show their commitments to society, but also as a way to enhance the reputation of their company. 
Showing themselves to be socially responsible has become part of the competitive game for com-
panies, including the banks, but as Rosamund (2015) notes, the risk here is that company directors 
focus more on the form rather than on the substance of their CSR claims, an outcome pretty much 
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similar to the case of binding legislation. Would banks, such as Barclays and Deutsche Bank, which 
are willing to break the rules and pay the huge fines, be more effectively deterred by voluntary ac-
tion for reputational enhancement which does not carry any fine with it? Many would raise serious 
doubts about it. 
  However, even if one assumes that compulsory norms in the form of legislation offer a better solu-
tion they should not ignore the legal barriers, often formidable placed on law enforcers by the legis-
lation itself. A good example is the introduction in The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013 of a new criminal offence targeting senior managers of financial institutions.  
  The offence imposes criminal sanctions on senior managers who, while aware of the risks, take 
decisions which cause failure of the financial institution. To meet the requirements of the Act the 
conduct must fall “far below”75 what would be reasonably expected of them. The offence covers 
also cases where senior managers fail to act
76
. 
  The initial proposal for the introduction of criminal sanctions was made by the Treasury in 2012
77
. 
The justification was that the existing legal framework at the time did not cover matters such as 
negligence, incompetence or recklessness or other forms of purely managerial misconduct. The is-
sue was particularly important because earlier investigation into the causes of the financial crisis 
had showed that one of the reasons that no senior bank manager was jailed for the crisis was the ab-
sence of any legal provision providing for such a punishment
78
. The new criminal offence was 
aimed at filling this vacuum. 
  Some early problems created by the proposal appeared already in the Treasury document, which 
proposed it: the new offence would be hard to prove, the persons to be prosecuted would be hard to 
identify and the criminal investigation would be time-consuming and very expensive. The public 
consultation, which followed
79
 revealed additional problems: most of the respondents opposed the 
proposal citing as reasons that it would deter people from becoming Bank Directors and that it 
would add little to the existing legal framework.  
  Despite opposition, the UK government went ahead and included the new criminal offence in the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. The offence was finally enacted in March 2016 but 
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the question to be answered in the coming years is if this offence is a meaningful one especially as 
proving a causal link between a senior manager’s conduct and the bank failure and that the senior 
manager was aware of the risk and that the manager’s conduct fell “far below” the required stand-
ard may be a particularly onerous task for prosecutors
80
.  
  In March 2016 the UK government enacted also the new Senior Managers Regime, the Certifica-
tion Regime and the Conduct Rules
81
 and in May 2016 the “duty to responsibility” requirement. 
The package of new rules seeks to establish clear identification (through mapping) of senior man-
agement responsibilities within financial institutions, clear statement of the responsibilities of each 
senior manager, and clearer Codes of Conduct. The duty of responsibility includes action which 
regulators may take if a senior manager fails to take steps to prevent the violation of prescribed 
rules. 
  These rules may be offering more reassurance to the public, but will they help resolve the cultural 
problem in the sector or will they be viewed as another tick-box exercise where affected individuals 
will seek only nominal compliance? The problem with nominal compliance is that it does not touch 
the culture. Individuals do what they can to comply in order to avoid the sanctions but nothing 
more.  
6. Discussion: can we create more socially responsible banks by regulating their behaviour 
and culture? 
  Those pointing to the need to use laws and regulations with binding force to create an environment 
that will encourage banks to voluntarily become more socially responsible have a strong argument, 
but there is a need for a serious debate about the size and extent of reach of the binding norms espe-
cially as the opposition to the waves of new laws and regulations by proponents of deregulation 
have become increasingly vocal more recently especially in the US. In the latter, the Trump admin-
istration and Republicans raised strong opposition to the “overregulation” of US banks and in 2018 
the US Congress passed a law watering down a significant part of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was 
the key law passed by the Obama administration in the aftermath of the financial crisis to strengthen 
the regulation of banks. One of the key arguments against Dodd-Frank was that its restrictions were 
hurting significantly the small and medium level banks, which had significant activity in local 
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communities
82
. Another key argument was that the strict rules of Dodd-Frank protected the big 
banks, which had the necessary resources to meet the strict requirements of legislation, from com-
petition by smaller banks, which were facing market obstacles raised by the same legislation
83
.            
  In the UK there has been considerable debate about the reasons behind the slow economic and 
productivity growth in the country in the decade following the financial crisis. Underperformance 
of the financial services sector is often cited as a reason. Particular focus is on very weak productiv-
ity gains in the economy, which helps to explain the slow growth in wages and salaries during the 
decade following the crisis. Tenreyro (2018)
84
, external member of the MPC, Bank of England re-
ferred to a major contribution of financial services to the slow productivity growth. Although finan-
cial services themselves occupy a relatively small part of the UK economy they have a comparably 
higher spillover effect on the economy for example by keeping the provision of credit to the econ-
omy tight undermining investments and economic growth
85
. Tanreyro indirectly accepted that role 
of regulation, which, inter alia, forces banks to keep more capital and reduce risky activities, for the 
poor financial sector performance but defended those measures as necessary to avoid future finan-
cial crises. Tenreyoro’s admittance and views from other economists and the banks themselves who 
have attributed the poor performance to over-regulation causing weaker lending, less investment 
and lower productivity
86
 indicate that the extensive use of regulation can have significant social 
costs in addition to significant economic costs associated with each operation. 
  The past record of regulation as well as the signs sent more recently by Barclays, Deutsche Bank 
and other high-profile violation cases, which are reminiscent of pre-crisis recklessness, do not offer 
adequate guarantees that society can feel protected from financial crises. Someone could even argue 
also that the possibility of bringing about the desired cultural change is already remote and unlikely 
to happen. 
  Policymakers and regulators openly admit the obvious that they cannot prevent all misconduct. 
Mark Steward (2017
87
), the Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight at the FCA accepted 
that “…[o]ne of the challenges of conduct regulation is to recognize squarely that not all miscon-
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duct can be prevented”. McDermott of the FCA (201488) claimed that “[i]t is not the job of the reg-
ulator alone to weed out and punish wrongdoers. Firms need to think about where risks might arise 
and how to control them: the need to understand the culture of the subsets of their organization, 
how they differ and what that means”. 
  This approach raises the critical question whether the current balance between compulsory norms 
and voluntary activities is appropriate or whether there is overregulation as many claim. Carney, the 
head of the Bank of England and of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the G-20 Regulatory 
body
89
, has defended the achievements of the efforts of public authorities in the UK and interna-
tionally claiming that the financial system is safer, simpler and fairer. But is it more socially re-
sponsible? In literature, McCalman et al (2017
90
) citing the results of empirical research by Simp-
son (2002
91
) claim that the proliferation of laws failed to deter corporate misconduct. They claim 
that culture is a social phenomenon, a non-tangible concept, and as such it may be difficult to draft 
a set of rules to regulate it. A similar view was expressed by the Group of Thirty, an expert group 
which in 2015 published a report on Banking Conduct and Culture
92
. A FSB 2018 report on finan-
cial misconduct
93
 cited estimates that bank paid globally 320 billion of US dollars in fines since the 
financial crisis. Carney admits that these fines are insufficient and inefficient to reduce misconduct 
claiming that if the resources spent on fines were retained by banks they could result in 5 trillion US 
dollars in lending to households and businesses. 
  Supporters of civil society often dismiss the role of regulators as being too close to the industry
94
. 
They also claim that regulators do not represent the interests of those parts of society affected by the 
financial crisis
95
.  According to them, civil society can play a more effective role. BSB
96
 is an ex-
ample of an effort to incorporate civil society into the process of setting the banking standards. It is 
an industry-driven initiative which brings together industry experts but also outsiders including civil 
society. However, one of the problems with the appointment of non-experts is their lack of 
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knowledge of the technical and complex issues facing the financial sector, which could make their 
contribution less effective. 
7. CSR implications and potential success stories 
  Being socially responsible is important not only for UK banks but also for the broader UK society, 
which currently faces several challenges from Brexit and globalisation. A wide range of problems 
from income inequality, poverty and unemployment to climate change and sustainability cannot be 
addressed without banks behaving in a more responsible way. For example, banks could reduce 
funding on projects resulting in environmental damage and increase funding an projects creating 
employment in deprived areas. Consideration of financial returns should not be the primary concern 
is such cases. 
  While all UK banks highlight in their annual reports and press releases their positive contributions 
to the national economy and local communities, reality shows that these contributions do not belong 
between the top priorities of most UK banks. There is only a small number of banks, which have 
incorporated social contributions into their core businesses. 
  A leading such example is the Co-operative Bank, a bank whose business model is customer-led 
based around principles of the so-called ethical banking, which includes for example investing only 
in environmentally and ethically acceptable projects. Ethical banking has been around since the 
1990s and the business model in its essence gives priority to socially responsible projects over prof-
it-maximising ones
97
. Co-operative Bank follows ethical banking since 1992. Its case can serve as 
an example of both the contribution and the challenges facing banks with exclusive commitments to 
socially responsible projects: Co-op faced several significant challenges in recent years, as it strug-
gled to keep pace with competitors with profit-maximising priorities, and even faced collapse and 
exit from the market. The bank also faced internal misconduct issues, which resulted in FCA ban-
ning the bank’s former chairman from the financial services industry98. There are other smaller UK 
banks (e.g. Triodos) operating (partly or wholly) on principles of ethical banking without though  
managing to break ground on the mainstream. UK banking sector like in the rest of the world is 
dominated by traditional, profit-maximising banks. 
8. The way forward 
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  Any efforts to effect the cultural change required in order to make UK banks more socially re-
sponsible has to accept two hard realities. First, that the task will have to last for a generation. It 
took decades for bankers to abandon their old more socially responsible culture and to fully em-
brace, during the period of deregulation, the new, profit-maximising one. Bringing bankers back 
will take as long and the task will be even more difficult due to the fact that objective reality such as 
the widespread use of technological innovation, which currently generates new profit opportunities 
through dubious methods, for example, cryptocurrencies, virtual currencies and new complex fi-
nancial products, will keep provoking adventurism and pursue of personal wealth for individual 
bankers and market dominance for banks
99
. The efforts therefore to alter bank culture will have to 
be consistent and persistent with any positive results expected within decades. Second, the reality of 
ethical banks, which despite their socially beneficial nature have only marginal presence in the fi-
nancial sector indicates that it is unrealistic to expect UK banks to fully abandon their profit-
maximising priorities. 
  A more realistic goal would be to convince them that it is in their own interest to have a positive 
relationship with society. Almost all UK banks seem to accept that already: all in their CSR reports 
highlight the benefit for their businesses and brands from positive engagement with the local com-
munities and the CSR society. The problem with the current situation is that they do not engage 
enough. They need to act more on this acceptance. 
To do so, this author takes the view that UK banks need to act on two different fronts:  
  The first front is an external one, which concerns their interaction with the communities and the 
broader society. To achieve a better relationship with society banks need to increase significantly 
the level of day-to-day engagement with all stakeholders and support more projects beneficial to the 
community. 
 The second front is an internal one, which concerns the way the banks view their relationship with 
society and the way the individuals working in the financial sector understand the level of their per-
sonal responsibility to ensure that society is protected from harmful activities by the banks. 
  Acting on the external front will help to repair part of the damage caused to the industry's social 
profile from the financial crisis and the continuous scandals and will help to maintain in the longer 
term a more positive view of the sector, while acting on the internal front will help to check the ex-
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istence of bad elements of culture which contribute to crises, offering opportunities for crisis pre-
vention and for longer term peace between banks and society.  
  Improving engagement with the community and broader society is easier to achieve because it is 
visible and tangible. Compulsory norms setting quantitative targets for community engagement or 
achievement of social objectives (e.g. improve access to finance for poor and disadvantaged 
through setting of specific numerical targets) can be potentially more effective in achieving the de-
sired outcome of convincing society that banks engage more constructively with it. 
  Improving the way bankers view their relationship with society on the other hand is more difficult 
as it requires a top-down cultural change within the industry, which is harder to achieve. For such 
change compulsory laws and regulations, given their limitations, are less likely to be effective
100
. 
How can you make a greedy banker who cares only about his personal profit and career develop-
ment to consider the impact of his actions on the broader society? Can such a person be forced to 
change using compulsory norms dictating a specific course of action and threatening serious pun-
ishment in case of non-compliance? There are serious doubts about this especially if the banker 
thinks that they can escape punishment or if they do not think that what they do is a bad thing. In 
addition, and as financial markets evolve there is always the case that current norms do not effec-
tively capture all the new types of potentially harmful banking activity. 
  The reforms of financial regulation after the financial crisis made, though, a major contribution to 
effecting internal change by setting in place rules which help direct the spotlight on individual re-
sponsibility and accountability within banks. Greedy and irresponsible bankers can no longer hide 
behind the anonymity offered by the enormous size of modern financial institutions to escape pun-
ishment for opportunistic behaviour causing losses to their banks. The absence of clarity about the 
exact duties and responsibilities, which was  used as an excuse by bankers to avoid shouldering the 
burden of duty they deserved is no more available to them.  This should on its own initiate an inter-
nal process of cultural change within individuals, which if it reaches a significant number of them 
could bring about the desired cultural change within the organization as well. 
  However, the process of using increased regulation to enforce change has side effects which if 
they are not addressed could offset any potential benefits. The problem of slow economic growth 
and of the slow rise in salaries and wages in UK, which is causing broader dissatisfaction in society 
has in part to be blamed on regulation. Proponents may argue that this is a price society will have to 
pay to be protected by future crises or in order to tackle the culture of greed and corruption in the 
financial sector, but these arguments become less and less convincing as the economy continues to 
grow slowly and the banking scandals continue to hit the news on a regular basis. After all, there 
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are no adequate guarantees that the UK financial system is currently sealed from crisis by regula-
tion. 
 
9.Conclusion 
Wheatley (2014) of FCA, argued that the financial sector was “…confronting a world with fewer 
advocates than it would like: but, also, perhaps fewer advocates than it deserves”101. The statement 
demonstrates the nature of the problem facing the relationship between banks and society in the 
UK: the UK public does not have great confidence and trust in its banks and has potentially a more 
negative view of this sector than the facts would justify. CSR where all UK banks have long pres-
ence and has a strong voluntary nature, should be reinforced and used to help improve the public 
image of the banks especially on the issue of culture, but the enactment of a vast number of new 
compulsory rules in the latest reforms to financial regulation may be hindering these efforts by lim-
iting bank freedom too much. In such an environment, any positive change in the banks may be in-
terpreted by the public as a result of the compulsion of law rather than of bank voluntary actions. A 
better balance between compulsory rules and voluntary schemes is needed. 
  According to Boatright (2014, p.2) there are three critical ethics finance questions: a) what are our 
ethical obligations or duties? b) What rights are at stake? c) what is fair or just?  The ultimate ques-
tion is: how should we live? The answers to these questions should apply to the whole sector and 
help to shape the culture within financial institutions but they have to be provided by the individuals 
working there and not by the law. Most importantly the answers have to be communicated to the 
public by those producing them and not by regulators. 
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